In defense of the person and his agency in the field of neuromanagement A proposal from E. J. Lowe's philosophy of action

Abstract

This article shows how neuroscience applied to management assumes certain anthropological assumptions that reduce the person and his agency to mere causes by physical (especially neural) events. In addition to the criticisms and warnings that the researchers themselves sustain, this paper intended to show not only the intrinsic problems of such assumptions, namely the loss of the personal agency, but also the impossibility of leaving aside the person to explain his agency. The standard theory of personal action, which explains action in terms of causation by physical events is exposed showing some of its internal problems. We then argue for the necessity of personal agency, in terms of the person as «personal substances», from the analytic philosophy of E. J. Lowe. In the end, we conclude that not only is the standard theory intrinsically problematic (by losing the person), but that it is not possible to make personal action intelligible only by appealing to physical events.