Palabras clave
Mentalismo
Funciones ejecutivas
Metacognición
Cognición social
Cómo citar
Resumen
Este texto presenta una reflexión teórica de la teoría de la mente (ToM) y su configuración en la adultez, así como un abordaje de las evidencias respecto a sus componentes, tanto en la infancia como en la adultez, lo que involucra pensar que la habilidad de inferir estados mentales de los demás se manifiesta de manera cualitativamente diferente en la infancia y en la adultez. Se presentan evidencias alrededor de las bases neurocientíficas de la ToM y se termina explorando diferentes enfoques teóricos, en particular el enfoque ejecutivo, que aborda la teoría de la mente como una función ejecutiva (FE). Se concluye indicando que la evidencia señala que si bien la FE es necesaria para la configuración de la ToM no es suficiente para un adecuado desempeño mentalista.
Referencias
Abell, F., Happé, F., & Frith, U. (2000). Do triangles play tricks? Attribution of mental states to animated shapes in normal and abnormal development. Cognitive Development, 15(1), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(00)00014-9
Apperly, I. (2011). Mindreaders: The cognitive basis of “theory of mind.” Psychology Press. https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2010-24131-000
Apperly, I. (2013). Can theory of mind grow up? Mindreading in adults, and its implications for the development and neuroscience of mindreading. En Understanding other minds (pp. 72-92). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/ acprof:oso/9780199692972.003.0005
Apperly, I., Riggs, K. J., Simpson, A., Chiavarino, C., & Samson, D. (2006). Is Belief Reasoning Automatic? Psychological Science, 17(10), 841-844. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01791.x
Astington, J. W. (2001). The Future of Theory-of-Mind Research: Understanding
Motivational States, the Role of Language, and Real-World Consequences. Child Development, 72(3), 685-687. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00305
Astington, J. W., & Baird, J. (Eds.) (2005). Why Language Matters for Theory of Mind. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159912.001.0001
Astington, J. W., Harris, P. L., & Olson, D. R. (1998). Developing theories of mind. Cambridge University Press.
Back, E., & Apperly, I. A. (2010). Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription. Cognition, 115(1), 54-70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. cognition.2009.11.008
Caillies, S., Bertot, V., Motte, J., Raynaud, C., & Abely, M. (2014). Social cognition in ADHD: Irony understanding and recursive theory of mind. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 35(11), 3191-3198. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ridd.2014.08.002
Converse, B. A., Lin, S., Keysar, B., & Epley, N. (2008). In the mood to get over yourself: Mood affects theory-of-mind use. Emotion, 8(5), 725-730. https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0013283
Dodell-Feder, D., Lincoln, S. H., Coulson, J. P., & Hooker, C. I. (2013). Using fiction to assess mental state understanding: A new task for assessing theory of mind in adults. PLoS ONE, 8(11), e81279. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0081279
Fujita, N., Devine, R. T., & Hughes, C. (2022). Theory of mind and executive function in early childhood: A cross-cultural investigation. Cognitive Development, 61, 101150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101150
Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(12), 493-501. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S1364-6613(98)01262-5
Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(9), 396-403. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. tics.2004.07.002
Gavilán, J. M., & García-Albea, J. E. (2011). Theory of mind and language comprehension in schizophrenia: Poor mindreading affects figurative language comprehension beyond intelligence deficits. Journal of Neurolinguistics, 24(1), 54-69. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.jneuroling.2010.07.006
German, T., & Hehman, J. (2006). Representational and executive selection resources in ‘theory of mind’: Evidence from compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age. Cognition, 101(1), 129-152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.05.007
Hartwright, C. E., Apperly, I. A., & Hansen, P. C. (2012). Multiple roles for executive control in belief–desire reasoning: Distinct neural networks are recruited for self perspective inhibition and complexity of reasoning. NeuroImage, 61(4), 921-930. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.03.012
Jones, C. R. G., Simonoff, E., Baird, G., Pickles, A., Marsden, A. J. S., Tregay, J., Happé, F., & Charman, T. (2018). The association between theory of mind, executive function, and the symptoms of autism spectrum disorder. Autism Research, 11(1), 95-109. https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.1873
Kovács, Á. M., Téglás, E., & Endress, A. D. (2010). The Social Sense: Susceptibility to Others’ Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults. Science, 330(6012), 1830-1834.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1190792
Lin, S., Keysar, B., & Epley, N. (2010). Reflexively mindblind: Using theory of mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(3), 551-556. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.12.019
Mahy, C. E. V., Moses, L. J., & Pfeifer, J. H. (2014). How and where: Theory-of-mind in the brain. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 68-81. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.dcn.2014.01.002
McKinnon, M. C., & Moscovitch, M. (2007). Domain-general contributions to social reasoning: Theory of mind and deontic reasoning re-explored. Cognition, 102(2), 179-218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.12.011
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 515-526. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0140525X00076512
Qureshi, A. W., Apperly, I. A., & Samson, D. (2010). Executive function is necessary for perspective selection, not Level-1 visual perspective calculation: Evidence from a dual-task study of adults. Cognition, 117(2), 230-236. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. cognition.2010.08.003
Repacholi, B. M., & Gopnik, A. (1997). Early reasoning about desires: Evidence from 14- and 18-month-olds. Developmental Psychology, 33(1), 12-21. https://doi. org/10.1037/0012-1649.33.1.12
Riviere, A. (1991). Objetos con mente. Alianza.
Rothmayr, C., Sodian, B., Hajak, G., Döhnel, K., Meinhardt, J., & Sommer, M. (2011). Common and distinct neural networks for false-belief reasoning and inhibitory control. NeuroImage, 56(3), 1705-1713. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. neuroimage.2010.12.052
Ruby, P., & Decety, J. (2001). Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation of action: a PET investigation of agency. Nature Neuroscience, 4(5), 546-550.
Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Braithwaite, J. J., Andrews, B. J., & Bodley Scott, S. E. (2010). Seeing it their way: Evidence for rapid and involuntary computation of what other people see. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 36(5), 1255-1266. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018729
Schneider, D., Bayliss, A. P., Becker, S. I., & Dux, P. E. (2012). Eye movements reveal sustained implicit processing of others’ mental states. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141(3), 433-438. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025458
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014). Fractionating theory of mind: A meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 42, 9–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.01.009
Selcuk, B., Gonultas, S., & Ekerim-Akbulut, M. (2023). Development and use of theory of mind in social and cultural context. Child Development Perspectives, 17(1), 39-45. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12473
Surtees, A. D. R., Butterfill, S. A., & Apperly, I. A. (2012). Direct and indirect measures of
Level-2 perspective-taking in children and adults. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30(1), 75-86. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835X.2011.02063.x
van der Meer, L., Groenewold, N. A., Nolen, W. A., Pijnenborg, M., & Aleman, A. (2011). Inhibit yourself and understand the other: Neural basis of distinct processes underlying Theory of Mind. NeuroImage, 56(4), 2364-2374. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.03.053
Wade, M., Prime, H., Jenkins, J. M., Yeates, K. O., Williams, T., & Lee, K. (2018). On the relation between theory of mind and executive functioning: A developmental cognitive neuroscience perspective. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25(6), 21192140. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-018-1459-0
Wang, Z., Devine, R. T., Wong, K. K., & Hughes, C. (2016). Theory of mind and executive function during middle childhood across cultures. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 149, 6-22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.09.028
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655-684. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00304
Wellman, H. M., Fang, F., & Peterson, C. C. (2011). Sequential Progressions in a Theory-of-Mind Scale: Longitudinal Perspectives. Child Development, 82(3), 780-792. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01583.x
Wellman, H. M., & Liu, D. (2004). Scaling of Theory-of-Mind Tasks. Child Development, 75(2), 523-541. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00691.x
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103-128. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5
Zwickel, J. (2009). Agency attribution and visuospatial perspective taking. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(6), 1089-1093. https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.16.6.1089
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0.
Derechos de autor 2024 Renato Zambrano-Cruz